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ARTICLE
Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right
to Happiness and Safety
By JOSEPH R. GRODIN*
Most people, at least most lawyers, are aware that of the trilogy of
rights made famous by the Declaration of Independence-life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness-only the first two made it into the Federal Con-
stitution, felicity giving way, in the Fifth Amendment's due process clause,
to a more sober concern for the rights of property.1 What most people,
even most lawyers, are less likely to know is that fully two thirds of the
state constitutions contain provisions which either declare the right of per-
sons to pursue happiness or (along with safety) to actually "obtain" it.
Scholars, as well as lawyers, have tended to ignore these state consti-
tutional provisions, apparently regarding them as little more than pious
echoes of the Declaration. These provisions had their origin in constitu-
tional documents which preceded the Declaration and deserve considera-
tion as independent sources of constitutional rights. This article explores
the background and potential contemporary meaning of this long neglected
constitutional language. First, I provide a typology of the various consti-
tutional provisions as they currently exist. Second, I examine their history,
to show their derivation and changes over time. Third, I inquire into the
philosophical heritage of the relevant language. Fourth, I explore the man-
ner in which courts have treated that language over time. And finally, I
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law;
Associate Justice (ret.), California Supreme Court. My appreciation goes to Steven Knight, who,
while a student in my seminar at Hastings, helped me to develop many of the ideas contained in
this article, to Amy Chang and Joanne Clark, research assistants at Hastings and Stanford respec-
tively, and to academic colleagues too numerous to mention, but including especially Mark Aron-
son, Christian Fritz, Hans Linde, Calvin Massey, Herbert Morris, Jack Rakove, Harry N. Schei-
ber, and Reuel Schiller.
I. It is not only happiness which failed to make it into the Constitution, but, more broadly,
the concept of inalienable rights and the social compact. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. amend. V; Dan Himmelfarb, The Constitu-
tional Relevance of the Second Sentence of the Declaration of Independence, 100 YALE L.J.
169, 184-85 (1990).
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consider what relevance the language might have for modem state consti-
tutional jurisprudence.
I. Constitutional Typology
References to happiness, sometimes in conjunction with safety, are
found in two principal types of state constitutional language, though within
each type variations appear. First, there are what I will call "governmental
purpose" provisions, sometimes contained in a preamble to the constitution
but often in the body of the constitutional Declaration of Rights (or Bill of
Rights) which declare that happiness, or happiness and safety, is a goal of
2government. Typical is the Vermont Declaration of Rights, 1777, which
states:
Whereas, all government ought to be instituted and supported, for the
security and protection of the community, as such, and to enable the
individuals who compose it, to enjoy their natural rights, and the
other blessings which the Author of existence has bestowed upon
man; and whenever those great ends of government are not obtained,
the people have a right, by common consent, to change it, and take
such measures as to them may appear necessary to promote their
safety and happiness.3
Similarly, the Rhode Island Constitution includes: "All free governments
are instituted for the protection, safety, and happiness of the people. All
laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the whole; and the burdens
of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens."4
The second type of constitutional language, which I will call "rights
language," is found in the declaration of rights provisions of state constitu-
2. The Declaration of Independence itself contains such language, asserting that govern-
ments are instituted among men "to secure these rights .... " (i.e., inalienable rights including
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness) and that
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its founda-
tion on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, T EBILLOFRIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 319 (1971).
4. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 1986). In 1986, section 2 was amended to add:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. No otherwise qualified person
shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handicap be subject to discrimination by the
state, its agents or any person or entity doing business with the state. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding
thereof.
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2.
The Oregon Constitution similarly declares that "all free governments are founded on [the
people's] authority and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness." OR. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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tions, and is part of a statement of rights characterized as "inalienable,"
"inherent," or "natural." These provisions typically make reference to life,
liberty and property, but approximately thirty of them make reference also
to happiness, or to happiness and safety. Of these, approximately one half
refer to the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, or some varia-
tion thereof; and the other half refer to pursuit of happiness without men-
tion of obtaining it, and without mentioning safety.
A typical example of the "happiness and safety" formulation is con-
tained in the Iowa Constitution: "All men are, by nature, free and equal,
and have certain inalienable rights-among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting prop-
erty, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."5 The Iowa lan-
guage (sometimes with a more extensive statement of rights) appears in the
constitutions of California, Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont.6 There are, in addition, six states
whose constitutions contain some variation of that form. In Virginia and
West Virginia persons are said to have the rights to "the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and of
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." 7 In Massachusetts people
have the right of "seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness," 8 and
in Florida, the right "to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and
to acquire, possess, and protect property." 9 The New Hampshire Constitu-
tion lists "the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining
happiness."' 0 In Idaho, persons have the right of "pursuing" happiness and
"securing" safety."
Typical of the "pursuit of happiness" formulation is the language from
the Illinois Constitution of 1970: "All men are by nature free and inde-
pendent and have certain inherent and inalienable rights among which are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and the
protection of property, governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed."' 2 Again, variations
5. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1.
6. See CAL. CONST. art I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art II, § 3; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.J.
CONST. art. I, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.D. CONST. art I, § 1; OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 1; VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. 1.
7. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added); W. VA. CONST. art. m, § 1.
8. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 1 (emphasis added).
9. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
10. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2 (emphasis added). This provision is unchanged since 1784.
11. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1.
12. IL.u CoNsT., art. I, § 1. The Arkansas, South Dakota, and Wisconsin constitutions con-
tain similar language. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2; S.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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appear. Citizens of Pennsylvania and Arkansas, for example, are said to
have the right of "pursuing their own happiness,"13 Kentuckians the right
of "seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness, ' 14 and Montanans the
right of "seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways."15
The Wyoming Constitution refers to the "pursuit of happiness" in a state-
ment about equality: "In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness, all members of the human race are equal. 16 And the two
most recent state constitutions-those of Alaska and Hawaii---combine a
statement of rights, including the pursuit of happiness, with a reference to
corresponding obligations and responsibilities of citizens.1 7 Finally, there
are a number of instances in which "governmental purpose" language ap-
pears together, in the same constitution, with "rights" language. This is
true, for example, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 8
What, if anything, is to be made of all this language in the modem
constitutional context? Should it be regarded (a) as an interesting relic of a
natural rights/social contract philosophy which has no contemporary rele-
vance; (b) as a statement about the objectives of government which may be
viewed as a directive to the legislative and administrative branches of gov-
ernment, but not susceptible of application by the judicial branch; and/or
(c) as a statement of rights capable of being enforced, in some situations,
by the courts? If the latter, should courts view the language as describing
rights against government, rights to affirmative governmental action, rights
which trigger heightened "equal protection" scrutiny, 19 or even rights ca-
The Alabama Constitution is identical except that it omits the final sentence. ALA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1. Examples of constitutions with minor variations include those of Missouri and Oklahoma,
both of which add "and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry," and Nebraska, which
adds the "right to keep and bear arms." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; NEB.
CONsT. art. I, § 2. The Alaska Constitution declares: "This constitution is dedicated to the prin-
ciples that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoy-
ment of the rewards of their own industry .... ALAsKA CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
13. ARK. CONST. art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. The Pennsylvania Constitution, as
amended in 1790, reads: "[A]lI men are born equally free and independent, and have certain in-
herent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi-
ness." PA. CONST. art. I, §1. The Arkansas Constitution has contained nearly identical language
since 1874. ARK. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
14. Ky. CONsT. § I.
15. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
16. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2.
17. ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2.
18. See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTs (1776), reprinted in 1 ScHwARTZ, supra note
3, at 234-36.
19. The term "equal protection" is in quotes because some state constitutions state their
equality principle in different terms. See e.g., McKenney v. Byrne, 412 A.2d 1041, 1047 (N.J.
1980) (holding that the New Jersey Constitution implicitly includes a "concept of equal protec-
tion").
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pable of being asserted against non-governmental actors? Viewed either
negatively or affirmatively as a statement of judicially enforceable rights,
how should the rights be defined? And, in regard to all of these questions,
what weight, if any, should be given to the differences that appear in lan-
guage? Examining the origins of the relevant language in constitutional
history and political thought is a first step towards addressing these ques-
tions.20
H. Origins: Constitutional History
On May 10, 1776, the Second Continental Congress adopted a resolu-
tion recommending to the respective assemblies and conventions of the
colonies that they "adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the
representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of
their constituents in particular, and America in general.'
Five days later, on May 15, 1776, the Colonial Convention in Virginia
adopted two resolutions.22 One instructed Virginia delegates in the Conti-
nental Congress to propose a Declaration of Independence.23 The other
called for the appointment of a committee to prepare a Declaration of
Rights and a constitution for the State of Virginia.24 The committee's draft
was presented to the convention on May 27, discussed from June 3 to 5,
and adopted (with amendments unrelated to the key language) on June 12,
all of this occurring, it should be noted, well before Jefferson's draft of the
Declaration of Independence2 5
The Virginia Declaration of Rights was "the first true Bill of Rights in
the modem American sense, since it is the first protection for the rights of
the individual to be contained in a constitution adopted by the people act-
ing through an elected convention."26 Its opening lines and first three
paragraphs read as follows:
A Declaration of Rights made by the Representatives of the
good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free Convention;
which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and
foundation of Government.
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of
20. I am indebted in this effort to the stimulating work of Howard Mumford Jones. See
generally HowARD MUMFORD JONES, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPNSS (1953).
21. 1 SCHWART_, supra note 3, at 229.
22. See id. at 231.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. The body of the new state constitution was adopted on June 29, 1776. See id.
26. Id. at 231-34.
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society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their poster-
ity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of ac-
quiring and possessing property, and persuing [sic] and obtaining
happiness and safety.
2. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from,
the People; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all
times amenable to them.
3. That Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the com-
mon benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or com-
munity; of all the various modes and forms of Government that is
best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness
and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of mal-
administration; and that, whenever any Government shall be found
inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the commu-
nity hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to re-
form, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the publick [sic] weal.2
Meanwhile, the May 27 draft of the Virginia Declaration found its
way to Philadelphia, where a similar convention was in progress.2 The
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, adopted shortly .thereafter, contained
as article I the following language: "That all men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights,
amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety."
29
Vermont, in article 1, section 1 of its 1777 constitution, followed the
Pennsylvania language closely.3° Massachusetts, in 1780, modified the last
phrase to read "in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and hap-
piness. 3 And in 1783, New Hampshire, in its second constitution (the
first did not contain what the second called, for the first time in American
constitutional history, a "Bill of Rights"), changed the language to read
"and in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. 32
During the pre-federal era, this "happiness and safety" form which
existed in these five states was the only form of "rights" language to ap-
27. Id. at 234 (quoting the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776). Subsequent provi-
sions of the Declaration pertain either to general principles of governance (such as the separation
of powers) or to specific rights, such as the right to jury trial, bail, freedom of the press, and the
free exercise of religion. See id. at 234-36.
28. See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 43-44
(1955) ("[T]he Virginia Declaration of Rights was broadcast throughout the colonies in private
letters and public print.").
29. See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 264.
30. See id. at 322.
31. See id. at 340.
32. See iL at 374-75.
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pear in state constitutions. Other states which adopted constitutions before
1790 either contained no declaration or "bill of rights, 33 or included one
that contained no reference to either happiness or safety.34
The "pursuit of happiness" form made its first appearance in Pennsyl-
vania, which had been a pioneer in the "pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety" language. In 1790, that state, as a result of a constitutional
convention, adopted a new constitution and changed article I, section 1 to
declare that persons have the right of "pursuing their own happiness. '35
Thereafter, during the nineteenth century, the "happiness and safety"
and "pursuit of happiness" forms competed with one another, sometimes
within the same state. In 1802, Ohio adopted its first constitution, using
the original Pennsylvania language ("pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety"), as did Indiana in 1816, and Maine in 1819.36 The Illinois Con-
stitution of 1818, however, followed the language of the second Pennsyl-
vania Constitution ("pursuing their own happiness"), as did the Arkansas
Constitution of 1836 and the Florida Constitution of 1838. 37
The original Pennsylvania language reemerged in the next decade,
with Iowa's Constitution of 1846 and California's Constitution of 1849.38
Californians acquired the right to pursue and obtain both happiness and
safety. Wisconsin opted for the simple "pursuit of happiness," as did Indi-
ana (by amendment) in 1851, Missouri in 1865, and Kansas in 1861. 39
All of these variations appear to be quite deliberate. And read liter-
ally, they appear to be meaningful as well. The Virginia formulation, if
read literally, guarantees the "means" of pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.4° The right to pursue and "obtain" happiness appears to be
something more than the right simply to pursue it, and the right to pursue
and obtain safety implies something more than individual autonomy. Hap-
piness conjoined with safety appears to be something more than happiness
alone, and the right to pursue and obtain safety (viewed separately from
happiness) suggests something more positive than freedom from govern-
33. In addition to New Hampshire's first constitution, this was also true in South Carolina,
New Jersey, Georgia, and New York. See id. at 325, 374.
34. See id. at 276-90.
35. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
36. IND. CONST. of 1816 art. I, § 1 (1851); ME. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1993); Omo
CONST. of 1802 art. VIII, § 1 (1851).
37. ARK. CONST. of 1836 art. II, § 1 (1874); FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. 1, § 1 (1968); ILL.
CONST. of 1818 art. VIII, § 1 (1970).
38. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. I, § 1 (1879); IOWA CONST. of 1846 art. I, § 1 (1857).
39. IND. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1984); KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 1; MO. CONST. of
1865 art. I, § 1 (1945); WIs. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended 1986).
40. A more plausible reading is that the word "means" refers to the right of acquiring and
possessing property, and its apparent application to happiness and safety represents a syntactical
error.
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ment regulation. Similarly, the right of persons to pursue "their own" hap-
piness, absent reference to the right to "obtain" it, or to safety, suggests a
more individualistic perspective, arguably, than other forms. Finally, the
introductory phrase "in fine 41 or "in a word"42 suggests that the right to
seek and obtain safety and happiness may have been viewed as derivative
from the rights to life, liberty and property, rather than as an independent
right.
Whether it is appropriate to rely upon these semantic differences,
given what we know about their provenance, is a legitimate question.
Knud Haakonssen makes the point that while "many people certainly
talked" of the rights of man in the eighteenth century, "few people under-
stood exactly what they were talking about."43 It is possible that these dif-
ferences reflect aesthetic tastes more than variations in understandings
about the substance of rights. In any event, the question calls for an ex-
amination of the intellectual milieu.
IM. Origins: History and Political Theory
It is useful at the outset to disentangle our inquiry into the roots of the
happiness and safety language from the more traditional inquiry into the
origins of Jefferson's language for the Declaration of Independence.
Scholars engaged in the latter enterprise have almost invariably bypassed
the Virginia Declaration of Rights in their search for the philosophical
roots of that felicitous phrase. 4 But, as we have seen, it is the Virginia
Declaration, not the Declaration of Independence, that formed the model
for state constitutions in the pre-federal era and, so far as we know, Tho-
mas Jefferson played no role in the drafting of that document.
Credit for the authorship of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, at least
the portion that contains the happiness and safety language, goes by all
41. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 1.
42. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2.
43. Knud Haakonssen, From Natural Law to the Rights of Man: a European Perspective
on American Debates, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS 19, 61 (Michael J. Lacey et al. eds., 1991). A
similar point is expressed in JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 292 (1996).
44. The extent to which Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence was influenced
by George Mason's language is a matter of dispute among historians. Compare JULIAN P. BOYD,
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 16 (1943) (insisting that Jefferson's debt to Mason was "not
yet proved") with PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 133 (1997) (observing that an examination of the various drafts of the Declara-
tion reveals that they "were based upon the... Mason / committee draft of Virginia's Declaration
of Rights."). In Maier's view, Jefferson's "rewriting of Mason produced a more memorable state
of the same content. Less was more." MAIER at 134.
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historical accounts to George Mason,45 and so the inquiry must be where
Mason got that language. Unfortunately, we know far less about Mason
than we do about Jefferson, and what we do know casts little light on that
inquiry.
46
We know that the George Mason was born in 1725, the fourth in a
line of George Masons that began when his great-grandfather came to Vir-
ginia from England in the middle of the seventeenth century, obtained a
land patent, and became a successful tobacco farmer. His grandfather and
father were both prominent Virginia citizens, active in society and in the
political affairs of the colony. His father died when he was ten years old,
leaving him to be raised by his mother and an uncle by marriage named
John Mercer.
Unlike Jefferson, Mason had no formal education. Most likely he was
tutored at home, as was the practice within the Virginia landed aristocracy,
under the guidance of his guardian. John Mercer was a prominent lawyer
and patriot, a well-read man who maintained an extensive library, but as
the library burned without a surviving catalogue, we have no record of its
contents. Mason was an active correspondent, and a number of his letters
have survived, but these are mainly personal or practical, containing (un-
like Jefferson's correspondence) little in the way of philosophical reflec-
tion. The only direct evidence we have of his reading consists of a volume
of Cicero's Orations bearing his name and the date of acquisition.
47
Mason was politically active, apparently out of a sense of obligation.
George Washington was a close neighbor, and it is likely that the two were
friends at an early age.48 In 1748, at the age of 23, Mason lost a bid for
election to the House of Burgesses in Fairfax County. By the late 1750s,
however, Mason succeeded in winning that post. From time to time Mason
held other public positions, including membership on the Board of Trus-
tees of the town of Alexandria. At age 25, he married a wealthy heiress,
and became active as a member of the Ohio Company in the colonization
of Virginia's western territory. He was later to serve, along with Jefferson,
45. See I SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 232 ("[T]he Declaration was virtually all of Mason's
work"); see also RUTLAND, supra note 28, at 33-34.
46. The summary of Mason's life which follows is based upon PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON
(Rutland ed., Univ. of North Carolina Press 1970) (1787) and upon the following biographies:
HELEN HILL, GEORGE MASON, CONSTrrUTONAuST (1938); HELEN HILL MILLER, GEORGE
MASON, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY (1975); KATE MASON ROWLAND, GEORGE MASON,
RELUCTANT STATESMAN (1961); ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 1725-
1792 (1892).
47. The volume is contained in the small museum at Gunston Hall Plantation, Mason's
home in northern Virginia.
48. See I ROWLAND, supra note 46, at 54.
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as a moderate bridge between the conservative politics of Virginia and the
more radical politics of what became West Virginia.49
The Virginia Declaration of Rights was not Mason's first effort at
drafting political documents. He had a reputation as a patriot-spokesman,
and prior to the Revolution authored a number of pieces criticizing English
rule. The most important of these were the Fairfax Resolves, a set of
resolutions drafted by Mason and adopted in July 1774 by the citizens of
that county in protest of treatment by England. Those resolutions made
reference to the "safety and happiness of the community" as consisting in
that part of the English Constitution which provided for lawmaking
through elected representatives, "for if this part of the Constitution was
taken away, or materially altered, the government must degenerate either
into an absolute and despotic monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy, and the
freedoms of the people be annihilated."50 This ode to process appears to be
the only reference to happiness or safety in Mason's writings prior to the
Revolution.
Mason played a leading role in the Revolution, and became a delegate
to the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, where he estab-
lished a reputation as a leading anti-federalist. The proposed Constitution,
he believed, was flawed both in giving the federal government too much
power and in failing to include a statement of rights. He refused to sign
the document for these reasons, and during the battle over ratification, be-
came one of the Constitution's most articulate opponents. Recognizing
that ratification was inevitable, however, Mason served on the drafting
committee appointed by the Virginia Ratifying Convention to make rec-
ommendations for amendments.51
Predictably, the Virginia Ratifying Convention recommended that the
Federal Constitution be amended to include the language of the Virginia
Declaration: a statement of the "essential and unalienable rights of the
people," including "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety. ' 52 And surprisingly, James Madison-formerly an
opponent of a Bill of Rights, but by 1789 a pragmatic Virginia representa-
tive to the first Congress of the United States-proposed that language as
part of an amended preamble to the Federal Constitution.53 It was when
Congress decided to adopt a separate Bill of Rights in lieu of Madison's
49. See id. at 419.
50. Id. at 419.
51. See supra text accompanying note 46.
52. See 1 SCHWARTz, supra note 3, at 762-65, 840.
53. See id. at 983-84.
[Vol. 25:1
list of constitutional amendments that the language George Mason drafted
fell by the boards. 54
What can be said, then, about the sources of Mason's inspiration? It
would be a mistake to try to pin its derivation upon any particular individ-
ual or philosophical tradition. The eighteenth century was enormously rich
in ideas. 5 The leaders of the American Revolution were remarkably well-
read and thoughtful people, and their rhetoric regarding rights was often
more enthusiastic than precise.56 References to happiness as a political
goal "are everywhere in American political writings ... as anyone can see
who bothers to look."57 There are, however, several strands of classical
and enlightenment thought which carry particular resonance with the lan-
guage in question.
For Aristotle, "eudaimonia"-"happiness" or "flourishing"--was a
core concept in defining both human perfection and the goal of commu-
nity. 8 Just as human perfection consists in the attainment of one's natural
ends, i.e. the full realization of one's nature, so the perfect society is one in
which is conducive to that attainment.5 9  "[W]hat we count as self-
sufficient is not what suffices for a solitary person by himself, living an
isolated life, but what suffices also for parents, children, wife and in gen-
eral for friends and fellow citizens, since a human being is a naturally po-
litical [animal]." 6  By extension, social justice is identified with "the
things that tend to produce and safeguard happiness or parts of happiness
for the political community.' ' 1 The end (goal) of the best constitution is
happiness, defined as "the perfect [or complete] activity and employment
of virtue." 62 It has been suggested that Aristotle's theory of justice "does
require that the happiness and virtue of each and every member of the polis
be protected by the constitution, and in this sense entails a respect for indi-
54. See id.
55. For an extensive compendium of eighteenth century sources, see generally Herbert L.
Ganter, Jefferson's "Pursuit of Happiness" and Some Forgotten Men, 16 WM. & MARY C. Q.
HIST. MAG. 558 (1938).
56. See Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Constitution, in ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF LIBERTY 75, 82 (1988) ("The rhetoric of rights, equality, opportunity, happiness,
and liberty is necessarily ambiguous; and so to draw inferences and connect ideas with great con-
fidence is a misguided quest.").
57. MAIER, supra note 44, at 170. For a collection of references, see generally Ganter, su-
pra note 55.
58. See FRED D. MIL.ER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RIGHTS IN ARISTOTLE'S PoLTrIcs 18-
19 (1995).
59. See id. at 19.
60. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, quoted in MILLER, supra note 58, at 50.
61. Id. at 68.
62. ARISTOTLE, POLTMCS, quoted in MILLER, supra note 58, at 157.
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vidual rights., 63 But Aristotle's theory of government also entails the con-
cept of mutual, rather than solely individual, advantage.
64
The Roman classical tradition, with which educated 18th century
Americans were quite familiar, contained the concept salus populi.65 The
Latin "salus" embraced physical safety, but also more; its root, "sar," con-
notes being "safe and sound," a "sound or whole condition," including
health, welfare, and property preservation as well. 66 The term "welfare of
the people" perhaps best captures the concept. 67
In the eighteenth century, the salus populi was incorporated into the
social contract, or natural rights, philosophy of the period.68  Both the
"governmental purpose" language and the "rights" language of the relevant
portions of state constitutions appear in contexts which imply or articulate
some version of that philosophy: that men in a state of nature have certain
rights which "inhere" in them because they are human beings, and which
are "inalienable" in the sense that men continue to possess those rights
even after they have subjected themselves to common governance.
John Locke was certainly among the most influential of the social
contract theorists in revolutionary America, and the language of the Vir-
ginia Declaration identifying natural rights as including "enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property" bears
close resemblance to Locke's famous trilogy.69 But it is difficult to find in
Locke any strong support for the "persuing [sic] and obtaining happiness
and safety" language which follows. It is true that at times, in his Second
Treatise on Government, Locke uses the term "property" to convey rights
in one's person as well as in tangible goods;70 and that he makes reference
to the "Peace, Safety, and publick [sic] good of the People" as being the
"end" of Society.71 For references to "happiness," however, one must go
to his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he declares at one
point that "Man in his original Structure and Constitutions, was de-
63. See MILLER, supra note 58, at 138.
64. Seeid. at211.
65. See WILUAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 52 (1996).
66. SWEIS & SHORT'S LATIN DICrIONARY (Oxford 1869).
67. See NOVAK, supra note 65, at 52-53.
68. See id.
69. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 9 (1690).
70. Id. at 296 ("By property, I must be understood here as in other places to mean that prop-
erty which men have in their persons as well as their goods."). At other times, however, Locke
appears to use the term in a narrower sense, as in the proposition that men "unite for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,-which I call by the general name-property." Id.
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signed... and created solely for the enjoyment of his own Happiness.'
72
The Essay is more epistemological than political, however, and while its
language certainly establishes Locke as a contributor to the stream of
thought culminating in the Virginia Declaration, it hardly supports the sug-
gestion of some "Lockeophiles" that the quest for roots need go no fur-
ther.
73
The writings of Francis Hutcheson, a key figure in the Scottish En-
lightenment, were also widely read in the American colonies, and the par-
allels between his language and the aspirational language found in the
early state constitutions is, in some respects, striking.74 In his 1747 essay A
Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson wrote that "the end of
all civil power is acknowledged by all to be the safety and happiness of the
whole body; [and] any power not naturally conducive to this end is unjust;
which the people, how rashly granted it under an error may, justly abolish
again, when they find it necessary to their safety to do so."75 This proposi-
tion about the ends of government is in turn premised upon Hutcheson's
view of the nature of men-that they are "necessarily determined to pursue
their own happiness.
76
When Hutcheson wrote that the end of civil power is the "safety and
happiness of the whole body,"77 he was asserting more than a libertarian
principle that government should let people alone. "Locke's system of
government began with the individual's autonomy. Hutcheson's begins
72. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Bk. II, para. 243
(Fraser ed., Dover 1959) (1690). See also id at para. 52 (referring to "happiness" and the "pur-
suit of happiness").
73. See HUYLER, supra note 70, at 247 ("Not very much need be made of Jefferson's deci-
sion to substitute 'the pursuit of happiness' for Locke's own formulation .... It was, as John
Dickinson explained, all of a piece."). See also Edmond N. Cahn, Madison and the Pursuit of
Happiness, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1952) (arguing that Locke was the source of the
phrase for both Jefferson and Madison).
74. See GARY WiLLs, INVENTING AMERICA 175-78 (1978) (focusing on the Declaration of
Independence, with scant reference to George Mason, and arguing that the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, and particularly Hutcheson, may have been Jefferson's chief source of inspiration). Cf
Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Gary Wills's "In-
venting America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence," 36 WM. & MARY C.Q. HIST. MAG.
503, 510 (1979) (book review) ("In writing the Declaration, Jefferson had either Locke or
Hutcheson in mind, but certainly not the other Scottish writers."). According to Hamowy, "[a]
far more likely source of the sentiments expressed in the preamble... was George Mason's draft
of the first three articles of the Virginia Bill of Rights." Id. at 518.
75. Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1747), reprinted in 4
COLLECTED WORKS OF FRANCIS HUTCHESON 302 (Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlungbuch ed.
1969).
76. Francis Hutcheson, Nature and Conduct of the Passions (1728), reprinted in 4
COLLECTED WORKS OF FRANCIS HUTCHESON 33 (Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlungbuch ed.
1969).
77. Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, supra note 75, at 302.
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with social drives and interdependence." 78 Hutcheson disagreed with the
then popular rights-based theories of Grotius and Pufendorf; his moral
theories embraced duties as well. 9 His focus was upon public rather than
purely private happiness, as reflected in his adoption of "the greatest hap-
piness of the greatest number" as the test of a just society.80
Writing about the same time as Hutcheson, and in the same vein, was
the Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Burlamaqui. 81 Like Locke, Burlama-
qui was an advocate of the social contract, but, unlike Locke and other so-
cial contract theorists who viewed the state as an artificial institution su-
perimposed upon man to restrain and curb his natural liberty, Burlamaqui
saw man as an essentially social creature-in Aristotle's language a "po-
litical animal"--for whom society and government are necessary to the de-
velopment of his natural faculties.82 Foremost among those faculties is the
"desire for happiness," which is "as essential to man and as inseparable
from his nature as reason itself."83 Since man is "designed for happiness,"
it is the function of society to assist him in attaining it.84 When a person
has a natural right, "other people ought not to employ their strength and
liberty in resisting him in this point; but on the contrary .... they should
respect his right, and assist him in the exercise of it."85 A "just society," in
Burlamaqui's view, is
78. WILS, supra note 74, at 236.
79. See THOMAS MAUTNER, FRANCIS HUTCHESON: TWO TEXTS ON MORAL NATURE 52
(1993).
80. WILLs, supra note 74, at 250. As Wills observes, "Happiness was not only a constant
preoccupation of the eighteenth century; it was one inextricably linked with the effort to create a
science of man based on numerical guages for all his activity." Id. at 151. Indeed, Hutcheson
developed an algebraic formula for the measurement of happiness which, though it became the
butt of jokes, reflected an important concept: "the twofold measurability of happiness, in terms
of quantity within the individual and of the sum of individuals." Id. at 149-51. One may argue,
as did Adam Smith, that "by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessar-
ily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind," ADAM SMrrIH, THE
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3, vi (1759), but Hutcheson's view did not necessarily exclude
an affirmative government role in the process.
81. For a thorough discussion of Burlamaqui's views, and of their influence upon American
thought, see generally RAY FORREST HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI: A LBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAISM (1937). Francis Hutcheson's Essay on the Na-
ture and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1728) and A Short Introduction to Moral Phi-
losophy (1747) were both published before Burlamaqui's principal works. Hutcheson's A System
of Moral Philosophy and Burlamaqui's Principles of Natural Law were published in the same
year (1747). Wills asserts that Burlamaqui was a "disciple of Hutcheson's philosophy of moral
sense." WnILs, supra note 74, at 250. Perhaps in some sense he was, but that ought not deprive
Burlamaqu of credit for his own contribution.
82. See HARVEY, supra note 81, at 11-16.
83. Id at 18 (quoting Burlamaqui).
84. Id. at 17.
85. 1 JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUi, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAw 50
(1972).
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[N]o more than natural society itself modified in such a manner, as to
have a sovereign, that commands, and on whose will whatever con-
cers the happiness of society ultimately depends; to the end that,
under his protection and through his care, mankind may surely attain
the felicity, to which they naturally aspire.
8 6
Between Locke and Burlamaqui there is a subtle but important differ-
ence in emphasis. Locke's general view of rights is a negative one-that
they are rights which people have individually against the government, as
a basis for objecting to governmental interference with life, liberty, or
property. Burlamaqui, on the other hand, appears to be talking about af-
firmative obligations imposed upon government by the nature of human
beings, including an obligation to increase the happiness of its citizens.
For Burlamaqui, man has a duty to pursue happinessY and he posits an
extension of that duty upon the state. Burlamaqui, more than Locke,
reaches back to the earlier classical tradition of salus populi. In modem
terms, Locke's perspective is more libertarian, Burlamaqui's more com-
munitarian.
Burlamaqui was widely read and discussed in America,88 and his
ideas and language are traceable in the writings of many American patri-
ots. 89 Among the most influential of these was James Wilson, an avid fed-
eralist who in due course would become an Associate Justice on the first
United States Supreme Court. In 1774, Wilson, then a lecturer at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, wrote an essay called Considerations on the Na-
ture and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament in
which he declared that
[T]he happiness of the society is thefirst law of every government.
This rule is founded on the law of nature: it must control every
political maxim: it must regulate the legislature itself. The people
have a right to insist that this rule be observed; and are entitled to
demand a moral security that the legislature will observe it.
90
86. Id. at 135. For a thorough discussion of Burlamaqui's impact upon American thought in
the eighteenth century, see generally HARVEY, supra note 81.
87. See MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 231 (1978)
("Burlamaqui's incorporation of the duty to pursue happiness into the body of natural law repre-
sented a significant change in the doctrine. He puts this duty on a par with the duty to preserve
life and liberty, and by doing so he makes the principle that all human creatures should pursue
happiness a rational principle of natural law.").
88. See HARVEY, supra note 81, at 105.
89. See id. at 108-30. Reverend Benjamin Stevens, preaching before the Great and General
Court of the Province of Massachusetts in 1761, stated: "The supreme law of all governments is
the safety and happiness of the people." Id. at 109. (emphasis in original). Reverend Samuel
Lockwood, preaching to the General Assembly of Connecticut in 1774, stated that "the end of the
state is "general security and public happiness." Id. at 111.
90. James Wilson, Consideration on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of
the British Parliament (1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721, 723 (Robert Green
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Wilson supported this pronouncement with a quotation from Burlamaqui.91
It was also Wilson who asserted that in his "unrelated state," i.e. in a state
of nature, "man has a natural right to his property, to his character, to lib-
erty, and to safety." 92
As for the true meaning of either "happiness" or "safety" for those
who used the terms, indeed there is little that can be said with any assur-
ance. At least for those in the Hutcheson-Burlamaqui tradition (which is
also the tradition of the classical philosophers), the notion of happiness is
not simply circular-that which is pursued-but a deeper notion of self-
realization, the fulfillment of one's essential being.93 While the scientific
atmosphere of the Enlightenment assumed that everything was quantifi-
able, including happiness, 94 there was hardly any agreement on the identi-
fication of what it was that was capable of such measurement. 95
The term "safety" is similarly imprecise. Viewed independently of
"happiness," the term suggests physical safety, and may reflect the Hobbe-
sian natural law tradition which teaches that people relinquish the liberty
associated with the state of nature in order to gain collective protection
against domestic and foreign threats to stability and security.96  But it
would be more in keeping with the classical tradition reflected in eight-
McCloskey ed., 1967) (second emphasis added). This language echoes language in a letter from
John Adams to George Wythe in early 1775: "[U]pon this point all speculative politicians will
agree, that the happiness of society is the end of government, as all divines and moral philoso-
phers will agree that the happiness of the individual is the end of man." HARVEY, supra note 81,
at 118. In 1790, Wilson published his Lectures on Law, in which he declared: "Government, in
my humble opinion, should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights
of its members." James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights ofIndividuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 585,592 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (emphasis added).
91. Wilson, Consideration on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the
British Parliament, supra note 90, at 723. "The right of sovereignty is that of commanding fi-
nally-but in order to procure real felicity; for if this end is not obtained, sovereignty ceases to be
a legitimate authority." Id. at 723 n.c. (citation omitted).
92. lId at 592.
93. See BURLAMAQUI, supra note 85, at 10 ("By happiness we are to understand the internal
satisfaction of the mind, arising from the possession of good .... ). As Morton White points out:
[Tihe reason why the American revolutionaries were not utilitarians is that they thought
that man had certain duties and rights by nature in the sense of 'essence,' whereas the
utilitarian did not think he was extracting something from man's essence in asserting
that man by nature becomes happy by acting on certain principles.
WHITE, supra note 87, at 238-39.
94. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 93 (1891) (using in 1776
for the first time the formula, "it is the greatest happiness for the greatest number that is the
measure of right and wrong.") (emphasis in original).
95. See WH.LS, supra note 74, at 248-55.
96. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651). I would acknowledge that the
right to pursue and obtain safety could be viewed as a private right of self-defense, perhaps in-
cluding the right to bear and use arms, but there is little in the background of eighteenth century
America that would support such a reading.
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eenth century thought to view safety and happiness as related terms, to-
gether expressing the concept of salus populi, or the welfare of the people.
On that view, safety connotes not merely physical safety, but a state of
wholeness, or well-being.
97
Whether the early state constitutions drew upon the communi-
tarian/republican tradition of Burlamaqui and Hutcheson more than the
liberal/pluralistic tradition of Locke, I find it impossible to say.98 What
appears to be emerging from the debate among historians as to the relative
influence of these two traditions in early American thought is a consensus
that both played important roles and that attempting to separate and evalu-
ate their respective contributions may not be a fruitful enterprise. While
that consensus has developed from a focus upon the Federal Constitution
and its background, it applies with equal force to the early state constitu-
tions and their background as well.
What is to be said of those state constitutions which refer only to the
"pursuit of happiness," or to the right of persons to "pursue their own hap-
piness," and omit reference to safety? To the modem ear, at least, the dif-
ference sounds significant. Thus, when Pennsylvania, in 1790, adopted the
"pursue their own happiness" language in lieu of its original "Virginia-
like" language, one is tempted to say this is because Pennsylvanians
wanted to eliminate any suggestion that the state had an obligation, or at
least a judicially enforceable obligation, to provide either happiness or
safety. Such an interpretation of the change would find support in our
knowledge that the political forces that underlay the 1790 Pennsylvania
Constitution were demonstrably more conservative than those responsible
97. It seems to be in this sense that the term was used in the English Petition of Rights of
1626, see V STATUTES OF THE REALM 23 (addressing the King by reference to the "comfort and
safety of your people") and in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, see VI STATUTES OF THE
REALM 142 (referring to the "safety and welfare of this Protestant kingdom"). The "Committees
of Safety" that were formed in the various colonies in preparation for independence were di-
rected, not only at physical safety, but at general governance as well. See MAIER, supra note 44,
at 134 ("For Jefferson and his contemporaries, happiness no doubt included safety or security,
which would have been in keeping with the biblical phrase one colonist after another used to de-
scribe the good life-to be at peace under their vine and fig tree with none to make thee afraid.")
(citation omitted).
98. According to Morton White,
[T]he ultimate ambiguity of the American revolutionary mind is its failure to come to a
single conclusion on the role of government with regard to man's natural rights. Was it
merely to guard them, to see to it that they were not invaded? Or was it to abet and fa-
vor the people in attaining certain God-proposed ends?
WHITE, supra note 87, at 256.
There appears to be an emerging consensus among historians that the thought of the "framers"
was affected by both republican and liberal ideology. See JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, CAPITAL-
ISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER (1984); Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a
Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 30 (1992).
Fall 1997]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
for the Constitution of 1776, which is considered the most "radical" among
the early state constitutions. 99
Arthur Schlesinger, however, has argued that in the context of eight-
eenth century usage the term "pursuit" should be read as meaning some-
thing more than running after-that it connotes a practice, or activity, as
when we speak of the "pursuits" of life.1°° Gary Wills makes a similar ar-
gument-that since the seeking after happiness was considered part of
man's nature, the term "pursuit" meant something more than mere aspira-
tion: "Only when one recognizes the law of man's nature as his right does
one remove the obstacles and let him move free, knowing this is consonant
with the order of nature." 101 On this basis, Wills seeks to minimize the dif-
ference in language between the Virginia Declaration and the Declaration
of Independence, and questioningly suggests that the word "obtain" is sur-
plusage.10 2 I'm not sure. 
°3
The difficulty of reliance upon eighteenth century meanings increases
when it comes to the constitutions of the nineteenth century. Even if there
was a common understanding in the eighteenth century of what it meant to
say that people have a right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety,
which is doubtful, it does not follow that the framers of the nineteenth
century constitutions that adopted that language had the same meaning "in
mind." 1°4 Moreover, while the variations in language among the various
state constitutions adopted in the eighteenth century appear on their face to
be significant and deliberate, one searches in vain among the records of
constitutional proceedings for any evidence that this is so.
99. See Robert Levere Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania 1776-1790 227
(1942) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania) ("(By 1790, the] Counter-
Revolution was accomplished. It took fourteen years to complete the curve from the days in 1776
when the conservatives lost their control until 1790 when they returned to complete leadership in
the State.... But in the Constitution of 1790 they secured a form of government under which
they could feel safe from the excesses which characterized the State under the Radical regime.").
100. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Lost Meaning of 'The Pursuit of Happiness,' 21 WM. &
MARY C.Q. HIST. MAG. 325, 325-26 (1964). Schlesinger concedes that Locke uses the expres-
sion "the pursuit of happiness" in the sense of "pursuing," and suggests that Mason's phrasing of
the Virginia Declaration "may have seemed the more necessary" in view of Locke's use. Id. at
326 n.8; see also Ganter, supra note 55, at 564.
101. WILLS, supra note 74, at 247.
102. Id. at 245-46.
103. The difference can also be reconciled with Adam Smith's view that the untrammeled
pursuit of private gain tends to promote public happiness. See generally ADAM SMrrH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONs (1776).
104. William Novak has persuasively demonstrated, however, that the ethos of nineteenth
century America, at least until the Reconstruction period, was consistent with the republican tra-
dition. NOVAK, supra note 65, at 42-47. Novack's thesis, well supported by references to laws
and cases, is that American policy-making from 1787 to 1877 was dominated, not by a laissez-
faire philosophy, but by the vision of a "well-regulated society." Id. at 1.
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The most that can be said consistent with intellectual honesty is this:
Both the language and the intellectual background of the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights and of those state constitutions that followed the Virginia
model are consistent with two propositions: (1) that people are entitled to
pursue and obtain both happiness and safety (leaving aside how those
terms are to be defined) without undue government interference; and (2)
that government has an affirmative obligation of some sort (leaving aside
the definition of its scope) to further the happiness and safety of the peo-
ple. While there may be tension between these two propositions in some
contexts, it is possible for both of them to coexist as principles of govern-
ance. The argument for the second proposition is a bit weaker in the case
of those constitutions which follow the "pursuit of happiness" format,
though the Schlesinger/Wills analysis provides some support for that ar-
gument, as does the governmental purpose language where it appears.
Whether either or both of these principles are properly the subject of judi-
cial cognizance is a different question, which I reserve for later considera-
tion.
IV. Judicial Gloss and Contemporary Meanings
When we move beyond attempting to discern the meanings that the
happiness and safety language had for the generations that introduced it
into the various state constitutions and confront the question of what
meaning ought to be attributed to that language today, our difficulty is
compounded. The words speak to us from a set of assumptions and con-
cepts about law and society that we find difficult to comprehend or, at
least, to translate into modem experience. And, as we shall see, those
courts which have addressed that language so far have failed to develop
around it any coherent body of jurisprudence. The opinions are typically
shallow in analysis and tend, as has so often been the case with state con-
stitutional jurisprudence, to defer to the Federal Constitution and its inter-
pretation despite the obvious differences in language.
A. Hortatory or Subject to Judicial Application?
Courts in a few states have taken the position that the early provisions
referring to inalienable rights were advisory or hortatory only,0 5 and not
105. See, e.g., Sepe v. Daneker, 68 A.2d 101, 105 (R.I. 1949). There, the provision of the
Rhode Island Constitution read as follows:
All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety and happiness of the peo-
ple. All laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the whole, and the burdens of
the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens. No persons shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
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susceptible to judicial enforcement. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, for
example, declared in 1949 that article 1, section 2 of that state's constitu-
tion was addressed to the General Assembly as advice and direction, rather
than to the court as a restraint on legislative power 3 6 The Vermont Su-
preme Court has asserted a similar view of that state's article 1, section
1.107
Even on the basis of such reading, it should be emphasized, the lan-
guage is far from meaningless. As the Rhode Island court suggested, con-
stitutions are addressed to the legislative and administrative branches as
well as to the judicial branch, and those other branches have a political ob-
ligation to take into account constitutional commands whether or not they
are susceptible of judicial application. 10 8 This obligation is particularly
relevant to the affirmative connotations of the language, insofar as it points
toward a duty on the part of government to act positively in the face of
human suffering.
Those who would deny any judicially enforcible content to the lan-
guage can find some historical support for their position in the strong reli-
ance which the framers of the early state constitutions placed in legislative
bodies and in the framers' concomitant ambivalence toward the entire idea
of judicial review. I find that line of argument unpersuasive. Attitudes
toward legislative sovereignty and the role of the courts changed rather
quickly. By the 1780s, popular confidence in legislatures was on the wane,
and the idea of judicial review came gradually into acceptance. 10 The
early history has not hindered reliance upon other provisions of state con-
stitutions as a basis for the exercise of judicial review.
Moreover, some state constitutions which contain happiness and
safety language also declare that "[t]he provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
equal protection of the laws. Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant or se-
cure any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof.
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 1986). The Committee on Citizens' Rights responsible for
drafting the new provision stated its intent was to create an independent state foundation for indi-
vidual rights.
106. See Sepe, 68 A.2d at 105.
107. VT. CONST. art. I, § 1.
108. See Sepe, 68 A.2d at 105; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT E. PALMER,
LIBERTY AND COMMUNrrY: CONSTrruION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPuBLIc
82-83 (Oceana Publications 1987) ("When principled liberties were declared in state constitu-
tions, those declarations were not directed primarily at the courts as standards for judicial re-
view.... The declarations were directed at the legislative assemblies, stating fundamental princi-
ples by which the assembly should have felt bound."); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBUc 462 (1972).
109. See Wood, supra note 108, at 453-63.
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otherwise."'110 And such a declaration would appear to preclude adoption
of the "hortatory" approach."' Also, in a number of state constitutions, the
original language of the statement of inalienable or inherent rights has been
amended to add other rights which quite clearly were intended to be, and in
most cases have been, the subject of judicial cognizance. California, for
example, amended article 1, section 1 of its constitution in 1972 to provide
for the right to pursue and obtain "happiness, safety, and privacy,"'" 2 and
the privacy clause has been the frequent subject of litigation." 3  In 1974,
New Hampshire amended part 1, article 2 of its constitution, which refers
to "seeking and obtaining happiness," by adding: "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account of race,
creed, color, sex, or national origin."' 14 Missouri, in 1945, added similar
language asserting the equality principle, 115 as did Florida in 1974.16 The
Alaska Constitution of 1959 embraces the equality principle as well.
117
Nebraska, in 1988, amended its comparable provision to include a right to
keep and bear arms, 18 as did North Dakota.",9 Montana, in 1972, added a
"right to a clean and healthful environment,"' 20 and the right to seek
"health" as well as safety and happiness.' 2 ' For a court to single out the
"happiness and safety" language as being incapable of judicial enforce-
ment would be, in these states, somewhat anomalous.
110. See, e.g., CAL CONST. art. I, § 26.
111. The "mandatory and prohibitory" clause of the California Constitution was adopted in
1870 in response to decisions of the California Supreme Court which had characterized certain
provisions bearing upon the title of legislative enactments as merely "directory" rather than
"mandatory" in nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial enforcement.
112. CAL CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
113. See JOSEPH GRODIN ET AL, THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 39 (1993).
114. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2.
115. The 1945 amendment inserted "that all persons are created equal and are entitled to
equal rights and opportunity under the law." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2.
116. The 1974 amendment added: "No person shall be deprived of any right because of race,
religion or physical handicap." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
117. ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
118. The amendment added: "and the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of
self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all
other lawful purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the state or any subdivi-
sion thereof." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1.
119. N.D. CoNST. art. I, § 1.
120. MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
121. Article II, section 3, of the Montana Constitution now reads:
Inalienable rights. All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They
include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing
and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful
ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsibilities.
MONT. CONST. art. , §3.
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In fact, most courts have assumed that the inalienable rights clauses
have some judicially enforceable content. One of the earliest decisions is
that of the California Supreme Court in Billings v. Hall,122 which held the
Settler's Act of 1856 invalid under article I, section 1 of the state constitu-
tion because it deprived owners of settled property expectations. The case
produced three opinions, with Justice Terry arguing that the section repre-
sented a mere "truism," and could not be viewed as a limitation upon the
power of government.123 The other two justices, writing separately, dis-
agreed. 124 Chief Justice Murray declared that the section
[Wlas not lightly incorporated into the Constitution of this state as
one of those political dogmas designed to tickle the popular ear, and
conveying no substantive meaning or idea; but as one of those fun-
damental principles of enlightened government, without a rigorous
observance of which there could be neither liberty nor safety to thecitizen.125
And Justice Burnett, concurring, reasoned that
[Flor the Constitution to declare a right inalienable, and at the same
time leave the Legislature unlimited power over it, would be a con-
tradiction in terms, an idle provision, proving that a Constitution was
a mere parchment barrier, insufficient to protect the citizen, delusive
and visionary, and the practical result of which would be to destroy,
not conserve, the rights it vainly presumed to protect.'2
B. Happiness and Safety as Negative Rights: The Content the Courts
Have Given the Language
One of the earliest cases to rely upon happiness and safety language
as grounds for decision was Beebe v. State,127 in which the Supreme Court
of Indiana overturned that state's prohibition law on the ground that it in-
terfered with the right to "liberty and the pursuit of happiness."'1 That
right, declared Judge Perkins in the companion case of Herman v. State, 29
"embraces the right, in each compos mentis individual, of selecting what he
will eat and drink. ... .""o If that were not so, the legislature could control
122. 7 Cal. 1 (1857)
123. See id. at 19 (Terry, J., dissenting).
124. See id at 3-18.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 17 (Burnett, J., concurring).
127. 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
128. See Beebe, 6 Ind. at 510. Indiana's early Constitution of 1816 contained "pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety" language. See IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 1 (1851). The re-
vised Constitution of 1851 settled for "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." IND. CONST.
art. I, § 1.
129. Herman was decided on a petition for habeas corpus before Judge Perkins of the Indiana
Supreme Court, and appears in the appendix to the reports at 8 Ind. (Tanner) 545 (1855).
130. Id. at 558.
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individuals "as to their articles of dress and their hours of sleeping and
waking.' ' 131 If people were not competent to decide such matters they
"should be placed at once in a state of pupilage to a set of government
sumptuary officers; eulogies upon the dignity of human nature should
cease; and the doctrine of the competency of the people for self-
government be declared a deluding rhetorical flourish."1 32 Stimulating
beverages, the court opined, "were created by the Almighty expressly to
promote his social hilarity and enjoyment," and the potential for abuse
must be left to personal responsibility, for if God had wished to control
man's choice "He could have easily enacted a physical prohibitory law by
declaring the fatal apple a nuisance and removing it. He did not.'
133
The embrace of pure libertarian principles reflected in the Indiana
court's opinion did not survive the Victorian era. The Washington Su-
preme Court in Territory v. Ah Lim,13 in rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that his right to the pursuit of happiness included the right to smoke
opium in the privacy of his home, declared that "the state has an interest in
the intellectual condition of each of its citizens, recognizing that the fact
that society is but an aggregation of individuals, and that the moral or in-
tellectual plane of society is elevated or degraded in proportion to the plane
occupied by its individual members."' 35 It was a "matter of general infor-
mation," in the court's view,
[That [opium smoking] is a loathsome, disgusting, and degrading
habit, that it is becoming dangerously common with the youth of the
country, and that its usual concomitants are imbecility, pauperism,
and crime .... If the state concludes that a given habit is detrimental
to either the moral, mental or physical well-being of one of its citi-.
zens, to such an extent that it is liable to become a burden upon soci-
ety, it has an undoubted right to restrain the citizen from the commis-
sion of that act.
136
On the basis of similar reasoning, a sober Alabama Supreme Court upheld
that state's limitations upon the sale of liquor. 37 "A man's chief joy," the
court declared:
[Miay be in the death of his enemy, yet the law does not allow him to
pursue happiness in that direction. So his individual sense of bliss
attained may result from carrying on the liquor traffic, but the law
131. Id.
132. Id. at 558-59.
133. 1a1 at561,563.
134. 24 P. 588 (Wash. 1890).
135. Id. at 589.
136. Id. at 590.
137. See Sheppard v. Dowling, 28 So. 791,795 (Ala. 1899).
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does not esteem that particular avocation, involving, as it does, in the
eye of the law, baneful consequences to society .. 138
Judicial reluctance to read the happiness and safety clauses as em-
bodying a general libertarian principle continues. Modem attacks on
marijuana laws in the name of happiness and safety, for example, have
fared no better than Ah Lim's claim with respect to opium.139 And the
same is true of claims that the happiness and safety clauses require the de-
struction of an arrested person's fingerprints and photo,14° and the invali-
dation of a state income tax.141 An exception is the decision of the Ohio
Court of Common Pleas, holding that school officials violated a student's
rights under article 1, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution when they re-
moved him as student body president, barred him from extra-curricular ac-
tivities, and penalized his grade point average because he insisted on vio-
lating the School Board's regulation of hair length and style.142 The court
stated:
It seems to us strikingly important that our founding fathers placed
this section first in the Bill of Rights.... In non-legal terms Section
1 establishes the principle that every American has the right to be let
alone and to be regulated by the government only so far as such
regulation is shown to be necessary to protect others or to advance
legitimate government purposes. This constitutional provision places
a heavy responsibility on any governmental body to justify its inter-
ference with a citizen's freedom, his right to enjoy liberty of decision
and to seek happiness in his own way. ms
At the same time that courts were rejecting happiness and safety language
as a shield against state interference with personal conduct, some state
courts came to accept that language, in conjunction with "liberty" and
"property" as a shield against state interference with economic activity.
Impetus for this development came from Justice Field's dissenting opinion
138. Id. at 795. See also Benning v. State, 641 A.2d 757-58 (Vt. 1994) (upholding law re-
quiring motorcyclists to wear helmets). On the basis of similar reasoning, the California Supreme
Court has upheld Sunday closing laws, see Ex Parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861), and laws
which prohibited slaughterhouses from operating within city limits, see Exparte Shrader, 33 Cal.
279 (1867).
139. See, e.g., National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Gain, 161 Cal. Rptr. 181, 187
(1979) ("The guarantees [of article 1, section 1] ... do not operate as a curtailment on the basic
power of the Legislature to enact reasonable police regulations. Here appellants have not shown
irrational conduct by our lawmakers." (citations omitted)). To the same effect, but considering
only the Federal Constitution, is State v. Leins, 234 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 1975). Cf. Ravin v. State,
537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (finding a right to smoke marijuana in the privacy of one's
home protected by the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution).
140. See, e.g., Mavity v. Tyndall, 74 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. 1947).
141. See, e.g., Cogan v. State, 657 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1983).
142. See Jacobs v. Benedict, 301 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio Misc. 1973).
143. Id. at 725.
[Vol. 25:1
THE RIGHT TO HAPPINESS AND SAFETY
in the Slaughterhouse Cases,144 in which he argued that the "privileges and
immunities" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment should be deemed to
embrace "the right to pursue a lawful calling in a lawful manner, without
other restraint than such as equally affects all persons," and in which he
quoted from Blackstone to the effect that civil liberty "is that state in
which each individual has the power to pursue his own happiness accord-
ing to his own views of his interest, and the dictates of his conscience, un-
restrained except by equal, just, and impartial laws."' 45 Impetus came also,
but later, from Allgeyer v. Louisiana,146 in which a majority of the Court
embraced the view that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment includes:
[The right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his facul-
ties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all con-
tracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 47
Labor legislation came under particular attack in the state courts.
Courts in several states concurred in relying upon the inalienable rights
clauses to strike down statutes which required employers to pay their
workers at least twice a month. 48 The Colorado Supreme Court found a
statute regulating the hours of employment in underground mines to be
constitutionally infirm on similar grounds. 49
Licensing laws also suffered. In 1901, the Supreme Court of Illinois
found its sense of constitutional propriety, as informed by article 1, section
1 of that state's constitution, to be offended by a law requiring persons en-
gaged in the horseshoeing business to procure a license from a board of
examiners. 150 "It is impossible to conceive," the court declared, "how the
health, comfort, safety, or welfare of society is to be promoted by requiring
a horseshoer to practice the business of horseshoeing for four years, and
submit to an examination by a board of examiners, and pay a license fee
for the privilege of exercising his calling."''
144. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
145. Id. at 111 n.40 (citation omitted).
146. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
147. Id. at 589.
148. See Commonwealth v. Isenberg, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 579 (Pa. 1895); Ohio v. Lake Erie Iron
Co., 33 Weekly Law Bull. 6 (Ohio 1894); see also State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179 (1889);
State v. Scougal, 51 N.W. 858 (S.D. 1892).
149. See In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071 (Colo. 1899).
150. See Bessette v. People, 62 N.E. 215,219 (Ill. 1901).
151. Id.
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These decisions, which foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lochner v. New York, 152 were not based upon any separate analysis
of the happiness and safety language, but upon the implicit proposition that
the right to pursue happiness, or to pursue and obtain happiness and safety,
is an aspect of economic liberty. 53 And they assumed, in contrast to the
deference displayed in earlier cases, that courts should play an active role
in determining whether those rights were violated by particular statutes.
When the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned its Allgeyer-Lochner phi-
losophy in the 1930s, some state courts followed suit, but not all. As late
as the 1940s, the Indiana Supreme Court relied upon that state's constitu-
tional protection of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" to strike
down one statute which restricted the manner in which fire and casualty
insurance could be sold,154 and another which prohibited the "scalping" of
theater tickets below established prices.1 55 And the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held a statute which required a license for the professional
practice of photography invalid on the ground that the asserted justifica-
tions for the statute were "fanciful." 156 The court quoted an 1895 treatise
on constitutional law by Henry Campell Black, the author of Black's Law
Dictionary.5 7 Without benefit of citation to authority, Mr. Black pro-
claimed:
[Pursuit of happiness] is really the aggregate of many particular
rights, some of which are enumerated in the constitutions, and others
included in the general guaranty of "liberty." The happiness of men
may consist in many things or depend on many circumstances. But
in so far as it is likely to be acted upon by the operations of govern-
ment, it is clear that it must comprise personal freedom, exemption
from oppression or individual discrimination, the right to follow
one's individual preference in the choice of an occupation and the
application of his energies, liberty of conscience, and the right to
152. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York statute that regulated work hours for bak-
ers on the basis of substantive due process).
153. In his Slaughterhouse dissent, Justice Field quotes from Blackstone: "Civil liberty, the
great end of all human society and government, is that state in which each individual has the
power to pursue his own happiness according to his own views of his interest, and the dictates of
his conscience, unrestrained, except by equal, just, and impartial laws." Slaughterhouse Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 n.40 (Field, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). This portion of Justice
Field's opinion has been frequently quoted in state courts. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 79 P. 635,
636 (Wash. 1905); People v. Tyrola, 51 N.E. 1006, 1010 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1898).
154. See Department of Ins. v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. 1947). The statute at
issue restricted the selling of free and casualty insurance to agents selling exclusively on a com-
mission basis, a limitation which the court found had "nothing to do with the public welfare
and.., no substantial relation to the police power." Id.
155. See Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712,714 (Ind. 1949).
156. See State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914,921 (N.D. 1943).
157. See id. at 918-19.
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enjoy the domestic relations and the privileges of the family and the
home. The constitutional right to pursue happiness can mean no less
than the right to devote the mental and physical powers to the at-
tainment of this end, without restriction or obstruction, in respect to
any of the particulars thus mentioned, except in so far as it may be
necessary to secure the equal rights of others. Thus it appears that
this guaranty, though one of the most indefinite, is also one of the
most comprehensive to be found in the constitutions.
15 8
Such unbounded definitions of the interests protected by the happi-
ness/safety clauses are not likely to be of use in modem constitutional ad-
judication. Courts inclined to follow the Lochner tradition do not need
happiness and safety to bolster their views; liberty and property will do
quite well. And outside the economic arena, if the pursuit of happiness is
taken to mean whatever an individual may seek for herself, "happiness"
and "liberty" become equivalent terms.
If the happiness and safety clauses are to have any independent sig-
nificance as restraints upon governmental action, we will need to view
them as denoting a more limited area of human activity, interference with
which will trigger a level of scrutiny more stringent than mere rationality
review. Here, the classical view of human happiness, derived from Aris-
totle and reflected in the writings of philosophers like Burlamaqui, might
prove a useful point of departure. The right to pursue happiness, or the
right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, might be viewed as pro-
tecting individuals, absent adequate justification, from interference with
those decisions and activities that may be deemed basic, or essential, to
their identity and well being.159 Viewed in this way, such clauses could
provide an appropriate state constitutional basis, independent of federal
constitutional semantics (and surely more suitable than the term "privacy")
for protecting such interests in personhood as the right to choose an abor-
tion, or to pursue one's sexual orientation, or to end one's life at a time and
in a manner that one might choose. 16° Whereas "privacy" connotes
158. Id.
159. The plurality opinion by Justices Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy in Casey v. Planned
Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), seeks to identify a core of "liberty" interest in similar terms,
referring to the constitutional protections afforded to "personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education" as "involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy." Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. My colleague Mark Aaronson suggests that the
intended meaning goes back to Aristotle and the ancient Greeks, where happiness meant "flour-
ishment," in the sense of self-realization. See Mark Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor, 7 Hast-
ings Women's L. J. 213, 256 (1996).
160. Paradoxically, the New Jersey Supreme Court has read article 1, section 1 of that state's
constitution (which incorporates the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety) as implying
a right of "privacy," and has accorded a broad interpretation to the privacy right so derived. See
State v. Sanders, 381 A.2d 333, 339 (N.J. 1977).
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bounded individual autonomy, "happiness," or "happiness and safety"
points more in the direction of an individual's relationship to others. A
negative right to pursue and obtain "safety," if the word is to have a
meaning independent from "happiness," could of course be interpreted to
mean physical safety, and point toward a right of self-defense, or to bear
arms, but, as I have suggested, the idea of wholeness might provide a more
appropriate guidepost.
It might be asked what advantage such a jurisprudence would have
over the jurisprudence which has been constructed through the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Federal Constitution. And while the puristic answer
would be that the question is irrelevant (since state constitutions are inde-
pendent and primary), more pragmatic responses are available. The happi-
ness and safety language would provide a textual basis for decision argua-
bly more principled, or as I have argued at least more satisfying, than the
implied right of privacy upon which federal jurisprudence has been con-
structed. It would allow for the development of a state law jurisprudence
untethered from the constraints imposed by the sometimes wandering and
sometimes not compelling reasoning of the United States Supreme Court.
For state courts willing to assume responsibility for an independent state
constitutional jurisprudence, these are formidable advantages.
C. Rights Clauses as a Basis for Objecting to Private Conduct
There are several cases in which courts have relied upon happiness
and safety language as grounds for sustaining a complaint against a private
party, in the absence of any governmental action. An example is Melvin v.
Reid,161 in which the California Court of Appeal held that article 1, section
1 of the state constitution provided a basis for the plaintiff's complaint that
defendant had, without justification, exposed her lurid past as a prostitute,
and turned friends, who were unaware of that past, against her by making a
movie of her life in which she could be identified.162 The courts in such
cases did not come to grips with the state action issue. The potential for
application of the clauses to non-governmental action persists, but in light
of other developments (including, for example, expansion of the tort of in-
vasion of privacy) the significance of such a reading is probably not great.
161. 297 P. 91,93 (1931).
162. See id. at 91-94. See also Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance, 246 P.2d 778 (1952)
(holding that picketing by union, allegedly to compel employer to "coerce" employees into union
membership, violated the employer's right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" under the
Wyoming Constitution).
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D. Rights Clauses as a Basis for Affirmative Government Obligations
Either as an alternative or as an additional meaning, the happiness and
safety clauses could be viewed as a declaration, and even a judicially en-
forceable one, that government has an affirmative obligation to provide at
least the minimum conditions necessary for human happiness and safety.
This would entail, arguably, the assurance of such things as minimal re-
quirements for food, shelter, and medical care, and so far as possible, a
nondangerous environment.
While such a construction runs counter to the accepted view of rights
under the Federal Constitution, a number of arguments can be advanced in
its favor.163 First, state constitutions, unlike the Federal Constitution, often
contain provisions which impose affirmative obligations. 164 The most
common of these is a requirement for free public education, but also extant
are numerous directives, variously phrased, that the legislature make provi-
sion for the poor, the aged, or the infirm. 65 Thus, a reading of the happi-
163. See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, in 1968 THE
SUPREME COURT REViEw 199 (Philip B. Kikland ed. 1968) (discerning support in some U.S.
Supreme Court decisions for an affirmative obligation to care for the poor); Frank Michelman,
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969) (arguing that certain decisions of the Court purportedly based upon the equal protection
principle are best viewed as reflecting a principle of obligation).
164. See Burt Neubome, Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L. J. 881, 883 (1989).
165. See id. Such provisions include apparent requirements that the legislature provide for
"aid, care and support of the needy," N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; provide "[bleneficient provi-
sion for the poor," N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; provide "adequate provision for the maintenance of
the poor," ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88; provide "such economic assistance and social and reha-
bilitative services necessary for those who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are deter-
mined by the legislature to be in need," MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3); establish and support
such "charitable... institutions as the claims of humanity and the public good may require,"
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 18; provide an old age pension to all residents 60 years of age and older,
see COLO. CONsT. art. XXIV, § 3; provide "medical assistance and social services for persons
who are found to be in need," HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 3; "as the public good may require,"
IDAHO CONST. art. X, § 1; provide "asylum for those persons, who, by reason of age, infirmity, or
other misfortune, have claims upon the sympathies and aid of society," IND. CONST. art. IX, § 3;
"provide homes or farms as asylums for those persons who, by reason of age, infirmity, or mis-
fortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society," MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 262;
and "support such benevolent institutions as the public good may require," NEv. CONST. art. 13,
§ 1(1). See also MASS. CONST. art. XLVII (provide "a sufficient supply of food and other com-
mon necessaries of life and the providing of shelter"); UTAH CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (appoint
"overseers for the poor").
Further, in some states, such language has been recognized in court decisions. The New
York Court of Appeals, for example, has declared:
In New York State, the provision for assistance to the needy is not a matter of legisla-
tive grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our Constitution.... Although our
Constitution provides the Legislature with discretion in determining the means by
which this objective is to be effectuated, in determining the amount of aid, and in clas-
sifying recipients and defining the term 'needy,' it unequivocally prevents the legisla-
ture from simply refusing to aid those whom it has classified as needy.
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ness and safety clauses as imposing affirmative obligations along the lines
I have suggested would not be at all anomalous. In fact, it would be in ac-
cord with the views of numerous scholars who have argued for a right of
minimal subsistence.
166
Second, such a construction fits comfortably with the language of the
early constitutions that speak of both pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety,167 and at least according to the views of people like George Wills
and Arthur Schlesinger, 168 with the pursuit of happiness language as well.
Finally, such a construction is compatible with the postulate, gener-
ally accepted in the eighteenth century and often explicit in state constitu-
tions of all periods, that government exists for the purpose of promoting
happiness and safety. While one might argue that happiness and safety are
best promoted by libertarian principles, such an argument is not one which
courts in the twentieth or twenty-first centuries are bound to accept.
Some indirect support for such an affirmative obligation can be found
in a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Thiede v. Scandia Val-
ley,169 which relied upon an implied theory of natural rights (the state con-
stitution lacks an explicit inalienable rights clause) to grant relief in a
situation which it described as being "like a sequel to Steinbeck's 'The
Grapes of Wrath."' 170 Plaintiff Thiede, her husband, and their six minor
children were living in the Town of Scandia Valley but receiving welfare
from the Town of Fawn Lake where they had previously resided.171 When
the Town of Fawn Lake decided to withdraw welfare benefits from the
Thiedes because they did not live in town, the Town of Scandia Valley at-
tempted to evict them from their property and move them with their pos-
sessions to Fawn Lake.172 "The entire social and political structure of
America," the Minnesota court declared:
Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449,451 (N.Y. Ct. Apps. 1977).
The Kansas Supreme Court has followed New York's lead in declaring the Kansas provision
mandatory but subject to legislative discretion. See Bullock v. Whiteman, 865 P.2d 197, 206
(Kan. 1993).
166. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Enti-
tlements, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 41 (1990); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., Further
Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986); Peter
Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39
HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1987).
167. Arguably, the Virginia and West Virginia Constitutions, which appear to include a right
to the "means" of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety, are even more explicitly affirma-
tive in connotation.
168. See generally Schlesinger, supra note 100; WILts, supra note 74.
169. 14 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1944).
170. Id. at 402.
171. See id. at402-03.
172. See id.
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[R]ests upon the cornerstone that all men have certain rights which
are inherent and inalienable. Among these are the right to be pro-
tected in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the right to ac-
quire, possess, and enjoy property; and the right to establish a home
and family... Today the care of the less fortunate members of our
society is universally regarded as a proper governmental function or
duty to be assumed in the interest of general welfare.... The protec-
tion afforded by our form of government is not merely fair weather
shelter. It may not be minified by reasons of temporary economic
expediency.
173
On the basis of such reasoning, the court held that the Thiedes were enti-
tled to proceed with their complaint for damages against the Town of
Scandia Valley.174
If the reasoning of the Minnesota court in the Thiede case is not en-
tirely satisfying, neither is the reasoning of the Ohio Court of Appeals in
the only case expressly to consider an argument for affirmative govern-
mental obligation based upon a "happiness and safety" clause. In
Daugherty v. Wallace,175 the court rejected an argument by recipients of
general assistance benefits that a statute limiting benefits to a period of six
months, regardless of continuing need or the unavailability of work, vio-
lated their state constitutional right to seek and obtain safety. 176 The Court
commiserated with the plaintiffs' plight, which it characterized as "dis-
heartening and poignant," and recognized that as a result of the new legis-
lation many of them would face "life-threatening circumstances ... be
forced into homelessness ... [and] lose needed health benefits."177 But the
court was unable to read the safety clause of the state constitution as cre-
ating an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to provide subsis-
tence welfare benefits to its citizens.178 Rather, in the court's view, "the
framers meant to give no other substance to the word than that of an aspi-
rational statement of natural law rights upon which the state may not place
unreasonable restrictions. 179
In reaching this conclusion, the Daugherty court took no account of
the historical roots of the relevant language, characterizing it (erroneously,
as we have seen) as merely a "paraphrase[]" of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. 180 The court reasoned that if the right to safety had an affirma-
173. ld. at 405.
174. See id. at409-10.
175. 621 N.E.2d 1374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
176. See id. at 1377. An amicus brief, which the court ignored, argued a violation of happi-
ness as well. See id.
177. Id. at 1376.
178. See id. at 1378.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 1378.
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tive component, then the other rights referred to in that section-the "en-
joyment" of life, the "acquisition" of property, and the "obtainment" of
happiness-would also have to be similarly viewed. 81 That, said the
court, would be "untenable."
182
The Ohio court's reasoning is flawed. To begin with, it is of course
not impossible that some rights should bear an affirmative component but
not others, even others mentioned in the same section. The word "obtain"
is mentioned only in connection with safety and happiness. But even on
the court's assumption, it would be perfectly tenable to read the inalienable
rights provision of the Ohio Constitution (and of other similar state con-
stitutions) as imposing upon government an affirmative obligation to as-
sure the minimum means for the enjoyment of life and a legal system
which makes it possible to acquire and possess property.
The New Jersey courts have so far been similarly unreceptive to ar-
guments that the state constitutional "happiness and safety" clause imposes
an affirmative obligation. In Franklin v. New Jersey Department of Hu-
man Services,183 for example, the New Jersey superior court rebuffed reli-
ance upon article 1, section 1 of that state's constitution as a basis for
challenging a five-month limitation on emergency shelter assistance for the
homeless, asserting that such language was intended to express general
principles of democratic governance "fundamentally different from any
concept of a governmental obligation to provide social services."'184 In a
more recent case, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court, finding a
statutory basis for invalidating an administrative regulation that terminated
rental assistance benefits after one year, appeared deliberately to leave the
constitutional question open.185
181. See id. at. 1379.
182. See id.
183. 543 A.2d 56 (N. J. Super. 1988).
184. Id. at 67-68.
185. See L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 133 A.2d 964, 974 (N.J. 1993). "The
question before us is not whether the homeless have a constitutional right to shelter .... Rather,
it is, for now, what the Legislature intends." Id.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has also held that its state constitution does not impose
an affirmative duty to provide minimum subsistence to indigent citizens. See Moore v. Ganim,
660 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1995). The Connecticut Constitution, however, does not contain an explicit
inalienable rights provision. Plaintiffs argued for an implied right to minimum subsistence based
upon the preamble to the constitution (which refers to the perpetuation of "the liberties, rights and
privileges which [people] have derived from their ancestors"), and upon a reference to "social
compact" in article 1, section 1. See id. at 750 n.28-29. Even in this sparse setting, three of the
seven justices declared the existence of an affirmative obligation to provide minimum subsis-
tence. See id. at 751-810. Chief Justice Peters, one of the three, wrote a particularly scholarly
opinion relying upon early understandings of the government's obligation to help the poor; con-
temporary economic, sociological, legal and moral considerations; and the international law of
human rights. See id at 771-83.
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Arguments based on history and language aside, one can sympathize
with a court's reluctance to embark upon a course of imposing affirmative
obligations upon a recalcitrant legislature, especially in the absence of
clear constitutional guidance. There may be situations so egregious, how-
ever, as to call for some form of creative judicial intervention that would
respect both the principle of separation of powers and the principle that
government has certain minimal obligations toward those in need. A court
need not undertake supervision of welfare in order to decide that a par-
ticular legislative scheme falls so far short of constitutional obligation as to
trigger the need for a judicial remedy. As Chief Justice Peters stated in her
concurrence in Moore v. Ganim,18 6 responding to certain scholarly objec-
tions that recognition of an affirmative obligation would be judicially un-
manageable and counterproductive:
Judicial intervention will not be warranted to enforce the constitu-
tional obligation except in the most extreme cases-where individu-
als demonstrate that: (1) without government support, they actually
will be unable to secure the necessaries of life such that they will
face a grave threat to their health or welfare; and (2) for reasons be-
yond their control, they could not comply with the conditions the
statute imposes. Judicial intervention to enforce a constitutional ob-
ligation only in such narrowly defined circumstances of severe dep-
rivation meets all legitimate jurisprudential objections.
187
E. Rights Clauses as a Basis for Heightened Scrutiny Under the
Equality Principle
For a while it appeared that the United States Supreme Court was on
the verge of finding poverty to be a "suspect class" for purposes of equal
protection analysis, so as to trigger heightened scrutiny of classifications
that adversely impacted the poor,188 but the Court withdrew from that en-
terprise. 189 For those states whose state constitutional equality principle
depends, for its applicable level of judicial scrutiny, upon a characteriza-
tion of a statutory classification as implicating something like "fundamen-
tal rights" or "suspect classes," the happiness and safety clauses might
yield such a characterization, and thus provide a basis for something more
than deferential "rational basis" review in those situations-such as wel-
There are also cases in other states also in which courts have denied the existence of an af-
firmative obligation to assist the poor, but these cases are either from states which have no con-
stitutional "happiness and safety" provision, or cases where such provisions were not invoked.
See, e.g., Tilden v. Hayward, 1990 WL 131162, 1990 LEXIS 140 (Del. Ch. 1990) (no provision);
People ex. rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 30 N.E.2d 46 (111. 1940) (provision not invoked).
186. 660 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1995).
187. Id. at 782.
188. See LAURENCETREBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTION LAW 1626 (2d ed. 1988).
189. See id. at 1649-59.
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fare legislation-where the government has taken some action with par-
ticular impact upon the poor.19°
Conclusion
The initial reaction of people to the idea of a constitutional right to
happiness (or safety) is, typically, laughter, 91 followed (if at all) by dis-
missal of the constitutional language as the relic of an age of flowery
rhetoric, unsupported by precedent except along lines now rejected by
most courts and scholars. Fair enough. If the test of viability of a consti-
tutional theory is the response it would have invoked from those responsi-
ble for the relevant constitutional language, plus the response it has in the
past received from the courts, then we can probably write off any argu-
ments based upon the happiness/safety language as both likely and de-
serving of failure.
If, however, we start with the premise that constitutions are living
documents properly subject to change and growth in response to their envi-
ronment, and if we add to that the proposition that all language contained
in constitutions deserves to be taken seriously, then the matter appears in a
different light. To the extent that the language reflects religiously based
views of natural rights which are no longer widely held, we may find it un-
comfortable. But to the extent that it reflects a view of the relationship
between citizen and community that rests upon mutual respect and a view
of government as an extension of man's nature, with an obligation (as in-
dividuals have) to serve the needs of the community, it speaks to us in
terms exceedingly relevant to the problems of today. It does in any event
present a challenge to courts, lawyers, and legal scholars which they can-
not with reason lightly dismiss.
190. Article XII, section 3(3), of the Montana Constitution formerly stated: "The legislature
shall provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary
for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune may have the need for the
aid of society." MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (amended 1988). In Butte Community Union v.
Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986), an organization representing welfare recipients relied upon
this provision to challenge legislative action eliminating General Assistance payments to able-
bodied individuals under thirty-five who have no minor dependent children. Lewis, 712 P.2d at
1309. The Montana Supreme Court held that while this constitutional provision "does not estab-
ish a fundamental right to welfare for the aged, infirm, or misfortunate," so that strict scrutiny
did not apply, it did express "an interest whose abridgment requires something more than a ra-
tional relationship to a governmental objective." Id at 1311-13. Applying a "middle-tier analy-
sis," the court found the classification created by the challenged legislation to violate the state
equal protection principle and enjoined implementation of the offending provision. See id.
191. See, for example, my own snide suggestion that the happiness clause of the California
Constitution could be the basis for the largest class action in the state's history. See GRODIN Er
AL., supra note 113, at 40.
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